This is the second of two posts on Passenger Protect, Canada’s forthcoming no-fly list. Part 1 described how Passenger Protect is going to work.

Why we should be concerned about Passenger Protect

First of all, there’s the cost. Passenger Protect represents a huge increase in federal spending on border security. In fact, just a few months ago, CBC was reporting that the cost might keep the program from being implemented. Look at the numbers from the government’s own feasibility study: “Implementation costs for the RCMP, CSIS and the CBSA alone would range from $95 million to $270 million, the study estimates, with annual operational costs of between $19 million and $60 million. Costs for Transport Canada are not included in the estimate.” By way of comparison, the 2006 federal budget allocated $133 million for the entire Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, and about the same amount for hiring one thousand new RCMP officers. I’m no expert on government finance, but the Passenger Protect numbers don’t look good to me.

Second, and more importantly, there’s the question of effectiveness. Will the no-fly list actually make us safer? If the US example is anything to go by, probably not.

Now, to their credit, the designers of Passenger Protect have learned a thing or two from the disaster that is the US no-fly list. For example, unlike in the US, there will be an appeal process — so, in theory, you’ll be able to get your name off the list if it shouldn’t be there. Whether it will work that way in practice is another story, of course, but at least there will be a process in place. There are also specific criteria for adding names to the list, which as far as I can tell is something the US list lacks.

That said, there are still a number of big gaping flaws to reckon with. For one thing, Canada will almost certainly be sharing its no-fly list with the US. So if you end up on the Canadian list, you will also end up on the US list. And once you’re on the US list, you don’t get off it — just ask Maher Arar. (If a formal commission of inquiry can’t get you off the US no-fly list, what chance does a “Not-a-Terrorist” certificate from the Office of Reconsideration have?)

The Canadian no-fly list will also be using the US list as one of its information sources. Now, the US list is finally going to be cleaned up in the near future, but it’s certainly been the case in the past that that list was worthless. The Wikipedia article on the US list runs through some of the better-known false positives if you need examples. I frankly don’t understand how Canada’s security agencies will be able to extract reliable information from the US list. Our own records of individuals with ties to terrorism are far less comprehensive than American records, so I hope the Homeland Security people will be sharing everything they know about the 44,000 people on their no-fly list — because we’d have to be nuts to just use their list without evaluating the information it’s based on first.

Then there are the disturbingly vague criteria for including a person on the Canadian list. For example, the first class of people on the list includes any “individual who is or has been involved in a terrorist group, and who, it can reasonably be suspected, will endanger the security of any aircraft or aerodrome or the safety of the public, passengers or crew members.” Is the definition of a terrorist group restricted to designated terrorist organizations? Does involvement in such a group include just donating money? Does it include involvement antedating the group’s designation as a terrorist organization? Will such involvement itself qualify as reasonable grounds to suspect the person is a threat? These are not idle or unfounded questions. Remember, the agencies responsible for answering them have already helped send at least one innocent person off to be tortured in a foreign country; we can expect them to cast their nets wide and not worry too much if they catch a few innocent people along the way.

Also, the no-fly list will only work if the terrorists agree to use their real names when they book a flight. Which is kind of an important point, because it means we are spending hundreds of millions of dollars on a system that will only catch the really stupid terrorists. You know, the ones we probably would’ve caught anyway.

Incidentally, in the 18 months since Paul Martin’s Liberals first floated the idea, Passenger Protect has never once been debated in the House of Commons. The Special Senate Committee on the Anti-Terrorism Act did raise a few concerns about the program in the report they released this month (which recommends clarifying the criteria for adding names to the list and publishing guidelines on how to get your name removed), but the people you and I actually elected don’t seem too concerned about it. Maybe we should give them a nudge.